Abstract-Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are quickly gaining popularity due to the fact that they are potentially low-cost solutions that can be used in a variety of application areas. However, they are highly susceptible to attacks and it is very probable that an intruder catches already existing security measures out. AWISSENET (Ad-hoc personal area network & WIreless Sensor SEcure NETwork) is a project funded by the European Union Information and Communication Technologies Program that is focused on security and resilience across ad-hoc personal area networks and wireless sensor networks, and provides a security toolbox for trusted route selection, secure service discovery and intrusion detection. This paper deals with intrusion detection systems for WSNs and how it is used in the AWISSENET project.
INTRODUCTION
An ad-hoc wireless sensor network (AWSN) is a network composed of a large number of cheap and simple devices called sensor nodes which are probing their environment via sensors for temperature, light, noise, etc. and using the wireless radio to communicate these measurements to a gateway (sink node). These low-cost solutions can be used in a large area of applications, including emergency response, medical monitoring, homeland security and environmental monitoring. AWSNs are highly susceptible to attacks, due to both the open and distributed nature of the network, and the limited resources of the nodes. Research on providing security solutions for such networks has focused mainly in enabling access control, encryption and authentication, securing the routing layer and developing secure services and service discovery. All these techniques can be seen as a first line of defense, aimed at preventing malicious nodes to break into the network and preventing it to work as planned, or to retrieve confidential or sensitive information. However, there is a non-negligible possibility that an intruder finally becomes successful. Thus, a second line of defense is needed, able to detect third party's attacks and raise alarms, even if the attacks haven't been experienced before. The AWISSENET distributed intrusion detection system (IDS) takes care of this role.
II. INTRUSION DETECTION FOR AWSNS

A. Specificities and challenges
IDS for sensor networks differ in many ways from the one used in legacy networks. The challenges that IDS have to take up in the particular field of AWSNs include:
• Automated decision: nodes must be truly autonomous and adapt to the evolution of the network, without explicit user or administrator action.
• Limited resources: available bandwidth, memory, energy and computational power are highly limited.
• Localize auditing: each node has only limited view of what happens on the network.
• No node is trustworthy: no node can be trusted, since they can be quite easily compromised.
• Distributed IDS: since audit data is gathered locally, intrusion detection must happen on several nodes.
• Security of the IDS itself: compromised IDS agents should not deceive the IDS.
B. Network Architecture
Usual IDS are typically stand-alone IDS, where each node runs an independent intrusion detector. This is particularly true for network-based intrusion detection systems, which often consist in a powerful server located in the demilitarized zone or at network borders, and thus are able both to capture all network traffic and to analyse the content of individual packets for malicious traffic. Such systems are very limited in AWSNs, since local audit data are not enough to have a good comprehension of what is happening in the network, and due to the limited resources of the nodes. Cooperation between the different nodes is compulsory in order to achieve efficient detection, because local evidences are often inconclusive.
Since the network infrastructures that AWSNs can be configured to are either flat or multi-layered, the same approach can be used for intrusion detection systems. Hierarchical IDS are systems where specific nodes are in charge of monitoring their neighbours, with various level of
The work presented in this paper was partially supported by the EU-funded FP7 211998 AWISSENET project cooperation between cluster heads, as presented in [1] . Distributed IDS meet the decentralized nature of ad-hoc wireless sensor networks, where each node is responsible for collecting local audit data, and this knowledge is shared globally in order to carry out a global intrusion detection system [2] [3] . Mobile Agent Based IDS use pieces of mobile code charged with a specific mission and sent to other nodes. Depending on the system, the mission can be to analyse the local audit data of other nodes and bringing back the results to the originator [4] , or to run a specific attack detection on a node in order to distribute the detection tasks amongst the network [5] .
C. Collecting audit data
Audit data are collected by local agents analysing local sources of information, which can be hardware or network based. Physically manipulating a sensor node to retrieve cryptographic material like the keys used for encryption on the network, or to reprogram it are two examples of attacks that can be detected by monitoring the hardware. However, using the vulnerabilities of software (and especially the routing protocol) is often a simpler and easier way for an attacker to break into the network. Due to the ad-hoc nature of the network, nodes don't only have access to packets sent to them, but can also overhear traffic passing between neighbouring nodes and act as "watchdogs", detecting nodes forwarding selectively packets, or modifying them [6] . Since memory is a very scarce resource in WSNs, it is compulsory to efficiently select which metrics will be used as audit data. 
D. Intrusion Detection
IDS need to distinguish between normal and abnormal activities in order to detect attacks against the network before they are successful. Detection techniques can be either misuse detection, anomaly detection or specification-based detection. Misuse detection (also known as signature-based detection) consists in comparing audit data with known attack patterns. This technique is the one mainly used for classical IDS, but is not widely suitable for WSNs, since the (many) patterns that must be stored in the system and the expensive comparison algorithms will soon exhaust the node resources. Moreover, misuse detection suffers from a lack of flexibility and is useless when trying to detect previously unknown attacks. Anomaly detection systems describe the 'normal' behaviour of the network and detect any activity that differs significantly from it, and are thus potentially capable of detecting new attacks. The normal behaviour is usually established via automated training [7] . Specification-based detection is quite similar to anomaly detection, but the correct behaviour of the network is manually defined. It allows a smaller rate of false alarms, but the development of detailed specifications is difficult and makes it less flexible to the different environments.
E. Decision Making
Once a local IDS agent has raised an alarm internally, the next question that arises is who is going to make the final decision that a node is effectively an intruder and which action should be taken. Independent Decision-making Systems are usually used in cluster-based architectures because they leave the decision that a node is effectively an intruder to specific nodes (which then are cluster heads). The alternative solution is Cooperative Intrusion Detection Systems. When an attack seems to have been detected, the node appeals to neighbouring nodes in order to output a global decision. This often is done via a voting mechanism.
III. THE AWISSENET APPROACH
A. Local architecture
Depending on the context (for example which routing protocol is used, or the services deployed in the network) and the capabilities of the heterogeneous nodes (in terms of energy, memory and computational power), different intrusion detection algorithms can be used in order to offer the best ratio between efficient detection and resources consumption. The AWISSENET distributed IDS proposes a plug-in based architecture in order to enable an easy and flexible management of the algorithms running on each node (which can be of any of the three kinds of detection techniques mentioned before). Thus the local IDS agent is composed of the following components:
• The plug-in manager is responsible for the configuration of the running algorithms and the mapping between plug-ins and audit data
• The data manager is responsible for collecting and storing the data and metrics used by the algorithms.
• The decision module is managing the interactions between the local algorithms and the other IDS agents in the network in order to output a global decision.
• The communication module is used to exchange messages between different IDS agents (audit data exchanges and decision taking)
B. Network architecure
In order to cope with the heterogeneity of the network, and in order to maximize the efficiency of the intrusion detection compared to the resources use, only a subset of the AWISSENET nodes run intrusion algorithms. The architecture that has been chosen is an hybrid one between the hierarchical and the distributed approach. The network is partitioned in several clusters, each one having a node with a specific role (the cluster head). Inside each cluster, and at the global level between cluster heads, we use a distributed architecture. The intrusions detections and assumptions, and the other IDS messages are exchanged inside a cluster, and the cluster members cooperatively take the decisions. The cluster head is then responsible for iterating the same process at the global network level. This approach enables more scalability, since having a completely distributed and cooperative IDS would produce too many messages that would flood the network. It also minimizes the drawbacks of the hierarchical architectures by introducing a high cooperation between the nodes.
The formation of the clusters is a difficult problem that needs to take several parameters into account, like the number of nodes able to run an IDS agent, the repartition of the IDS nodes, the topology of the network, or the mobility of the nodes. In our approach, clusters are statically determined when the network is deployed, using specific guidelines. AWISSENET clusters can be multi-hop, are almost of the same size, and the size of a cluster is the same magnitude as the number of clusters in the network. We intend to develop light and specific algorithms for coping with the mobility and disappearance of nodes, without jeopardizing the behavior of the network.
C. Secure IDS exchanges
As the decisions taken by the IDS can expel a node from the network, it should be very careful not being compromised, and needs to ensure the integrity of the messages exchanged between the nodes and that they are sent by legitimate ones. Using asymmetric cryptography and a public-key encryption scheme would ensure the authentication of the nodes, and enable the ciphering of messages, but this would be very expensive for the network. The AWISSENET DIDS uses timestamps and digests to secure the communications between the IDS agents, which are inspired by the secure OLSR plug-in [8] . Secret keys are shared inside each cluster and between the cluster heads and used to produce and check the digests of the messages. Timestamps are used to determine the freshness of the messages and prevent replay attacks. In order to securely synchronize (or re-synchronize if needed) clocks between two nodes, an exchange of timestamps is done with challengeresponse messages that are displayed in Fig. 3 . Any message received with an invalid timestamp or digest is then discarded by the IDS agent, and an alert is raised. 
D. Decision mechanisms & recovery
Alerts raised by the local IDS agents can express, depending on the algorithms, the certainty to have detected an intrusion, or only the assumption that something abnormal is happening (the evidence is inconclusive). The nodes belonging to the cluster share these alerts, and a voting mechanism is launched to output a decision whether the alert should be forwarded to the network level or not. The same knowledge sharing and voting mechanism is used between the cluster heads to output a global decision at the network level. This decision (which can be the identification of an intrusion and / or an intruder, or simply a false alarm) is sent back to the nodes by the cluster heads. The intruder is then isolated from the network via the routing module, and if needed, cryptographic material is updated.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
AWSNs impose new challenges on the design of IDS, which are more imperative than ever due to the unattended operations in open environments. We propose to implement a flexible and efficient intrusion detection system, which can then be used in a variety of wireless network and devices. Our concept is currently being validated through a large and heterogeneous test-bed.
